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LEGISLATIVE REFORM
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
REHABILITATING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Beth Collins*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, two federal appellate courts have interpreted the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) in drastically different ways. The split between the
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits has serious implications for individuals with dis-
abilities and their employers. The Eleventh Circuit allows more employees to
make discrimination claims under the ADA but fails to effectively protect em-
ployers. The Ninth Circuit eliminates ADA protection for a group of public em-
ployees but provides more administrative shields for employers. Should the Su-
preme Court choose to resolve the matter, it may endorse the reasoning of one
or the other Circuit, but this would be a mistake. The Eleventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits' interpretations of the ADA contravene Congress' intent in enacting the
ADA' because they both fail to provide a consistent, clear, efficient, and com-
prehensive statutory and regulatory regime to provide individuals with disabili-
ties critical protection from employment discrimination.'
* Beth Ann Collins, J.D. Candidate at UCLA School of Law; B.A. in Biological Sciences
from Smith College. Special thanks to Professor Jody Freeman for her guidance throughout this
project. All my love to my family and friends who give me unwavering love and support. Thank
you all for being in my life.
I. Two of the four purposes Congress outlined for enacting the ADA and the ADA's en-
forcement provisions include a call for a consistent, clear, efficient, and comprehensive statutory
and regulatory regime to protect individuals with disabilities. Congress enacted the ADA 1) "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities" and 2) "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2)
(1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994) (coordinating enforcement authority for actions
alleging employment discrimination under Title I and another anti-discrimination statute, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, mandating the responsible administrative agencies to "avoid[ I dupli-
cation of effort and prevent[ ] imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards.").
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l)-(9) (1994) (detailing Congressional findings stating that
"some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities" and these "indi-
viduals ... continually encounter various forms of discrimination" and "are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society . .
Additionally:
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Under the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation in Bledsoe v. Palm Beach
County Soil and Water Conservation Dist.,' one individual with a disability with
four different jobs potentially could be covered by four different ADA statutory
and regulatory regimes, one for each type of employer Under Bledsoe, an em-
ployee's ADA protection differs if she works for 1) a private employer who
employs fifteen or more people, 2) a private employer who employs less than
fifteen people, 3) a public employer who employs fifteen or more people, or 4) a
public employer who employs less than fifteen people.' Thus, depending on
which employer discriminated against her, two different sets of administrative
and substantive regulations6 enforced by two different agencies might control
her ADA claimr? 7 The web of regulations resulting from the Eleventh Circuit's
Bledsoe decision violates Congress' mandate to create a clear, consistent, and
efficient statutory and regulatory scheme to enforce the ADA.
The Ninth Circuit in Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice attempted to
resolve this problem.8 The court mandated that all employment claims must fall
under one ADA title, administered by a single agency under a single set of sub-
stantive and administrative regulations.9 Although Zimmerman provides a more
clear statutory and regulatory scheme, eliminates uncertainty, and streamlines
the process, the solution fails because it unnecessarily restricts ADA protection
from public employees (like the plaintiff in Bledsoe), contravening Congress'
intent in the ADA to provide comprehensive protection for individuals with
disabilities.
[Clensus data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as
a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, voca-
tionally, economically, and educationally.... [Tihe Nation's proper goals regarding individuals
with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.
Id.
3. 133 F.3d 816 (llth Cir. 1998).
4. Id.
5. Title I defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year ... " 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (1994). See infra part I describ-
ing coverage under Title I and I of the ADA. Title 11 can be interpreted to cover employment
discrimination by public entities (employers) of all sizes. See infra part I for an explanation of
Title Ifs statutory and regulatory regime.
6. The employer's classification determines the controlling substantive regulations such as
the definitions of "qualified individual with a disability" and "major life activities" and adminis-
trative regulations such as whether the agency will bar her claim if she fails to meet a 180 day
statute of limitations or will allow her to proceed directly to court, bypassing all administrative
requirements. Part I(A).
7. Infra Part Il(A)(1) (describing the ADA's statutory and regulatory regime).
8. 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999).
9. id. at 1183.
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In this Article, I propose an alternative approach that satisfies Congress' in-
tent and guards the interests of both employees and employers. My solution
integrates the Eleventh Circuit's more comprehensive protection of individuals
with disabilities with the Ninth Circuit's clear, consistent, and efficient ap-
proach, providing superior protection for employment discrimination under the
ADA. My approach fulfills Congress' intent better than either the Eleventh or
Ninth Circuit's solutions because it 1) creates a more consistent statutory and
regulatory regime, 2) promotes clearer and more efficient administrative solu-
tions to employment discrimination claims, and 3) ensures more comprehensive
protection for both individuals with disabilities and small government employ-
ers.
In Part I, I describe how the current inconsistencies originated in the stat-
ute's initial design and describe the Eleventh and Ninth Circuit split. In Part 1I, I
propose an alternative solution that places all employment claims under Title I,
not Title II of the ADA and re-defines "employer" under Title I to include all
public employers, even those with fewer than fifteen employees. In Part II, I
also outline a plan for the Supreme Court, federal agencies, or Congress to im-
plement the solution. In Part III, I argue that my alternative solution improves
both the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits' interpretations by fulfilling Congress'
intent to create a consistent, clear, efficient, and comprehensive statutory and
regulatory regime.
II. THE ROAD TO A CIRcurr SPLIT
A. Constructing the ADA
Congress' construction of the ADA led to the current inconsistencies in
agency regulations because it places different federal agencies in charge of Title
I and II. Congress divided the ADA into four different sections: employment
(Title I), public services (Title II), public accommodations and services (Title
HI), and miscellaneous provisions (Title IV). Congress constructed the ADA on
the foundation of established civil rights legislation. Congress modeled Title I of
the ADA on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA), ° which addresses
employment discrimination against women and racial minorities. In contrast,
Congress fashioned Title II of the ADA after the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Section 504), addressing discrimination in public programs and activities."
Section 504 was originally based on Title VI of the CRA.12 Different agencies
administer Title VII of the CRA and Section 504. Congress assigned the same
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
11. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 701-797b (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-4a (1994).
2002]
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two agencies to administer Title I and II of the ADA. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) oversees employment discrimination claims
under Title VII of the CRA and Title I of the ADA while the Department of
Justice (DOJ) controls discrimination claims in public services for Section 504
and Title II.
If Title I and II functioned independently, two different agencies could ad-
minister the different titles without event. The EEOC could administer all
employment claims while the DOJ administers claims of discrimination by
public entities in their "services, programs, and activities." Historically, courts
interpreted Section 504's language "services, programs, and activities"'3 to
include employment (in part because no other employment protection existed at
the time).' 4 Both courts and the DOJ have applied the same interpretation to the
same phrase in Title 11.5 Although the ADA has an independent title for em-
ployment discrimination (Title I), the DOJ interpreted the Title II language
(modeled after Section 504) to grant the DOJ overlapping jurisdiction with the
EEOC for ADA employment claims. 6 Thus, the jurisdiction of the EEOC and
DOJ overlap in employment discrimination claims against public employers
with fifteen or more employees.
B. The Circuit Split
The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits disagree over whether Congress intended
to create a loophole for public employees to circumvent the detailed administra-
tive exhaustion requirements promulgated by the EEOC under Title I, including
a statute of limitations of 180 days after the alleged discriminatory incident to
file a claim.'7 The loophole allows any employee of a public entity, such as a
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
14. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1984) (citations omitted).
15. Title II prohibits discrimination by public entities in "services, programs, or activities." 42
U.S.C. § 12131 (1995); Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d
816 (11th Cir. 1998); 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (2001) (titled "Employment discrimination prohibited"
and placing the DOJ in charge of employment claims by public employees).
16. Title I, enforced by the EEOC, prohibits job discrimination by state and local employers.
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Div., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title I Technical
Assistance Manual 19 (1993), available at httpl/www.usdoj :gov/cit/ada/taman2. html.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). Congress mandated the EEOC establish administrative
exhaustion requirements modeled after the EEOC requirements under the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4-2000e-9 (1994). Under Title I, the EEOC requires that 1) an
employee file discrimination charges within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, 2) the
EEOC investigate the matter and release a Letter of Findings describing the results, and 3a) if
discrimination occurred, the EEOC must attempt to resolve the problem though conciliation and
obtain full relief for the aggrieved individual; but, if the matter cannot be resolved, the EEOC will
consider litigating the case or 3b) if the EEOC does not find a basis for a claim or it decides not to
litigate the case, the EEOC will issue a "right to sue letter" and the party has ninety days to file
suit against the employer. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, TEcHNicAL
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state or local government, to file an employment claim under Title II of the
ADA without exhausting Title I's administrative requirements. 8 This discrep-
ancy deprives government employers and the EEOC of the opportunity to inves-
tigate and resolve claims in a timely manner without litigation, and creates un-
certainty for government employers because they may be unaware of pending
discrimination claims. In Bledsoe, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Title II's
anti-discrimination language "services, programs, or activities" as a "catch-all
phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the con-
text ... ." " Under Bledsoe, many public employees have the option of circum-
venting the EEOC's administrative requirements by filing employment claims
under Title II. The DOJ administers Title II of the ADA and does not require
exhaustion of administrative requirements before an individual may take their
employer to court. 2
In Zimmerman, the Ninth Circuit closed the loophole, holding that Title II
does not apply to employment.2 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation creates a
more consistent, clear, and efficient statutory and regulatory regime for em-
ployment discrimination claims. All ADA employment claims fall under Title I
and the EEOC's regulations that require administrative exhaustion. Unfortu-
nately, the holding needlessly narrows the protection of individuals with dis-
abilities under the ADA beyond Congress' intent, excluding all employees of
state and local governments' with fewer than fifteen employees from protec-
ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE 1) OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DIsAILTmEs ACT, § 10.3 (1992) [hereinafter TAM: Title 1] available at http//janweb.icdi.wvu.
edu/kinder/pages/taml.htm.
18. See Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 824 (holding that the language of Title U's anti-discrimination
provision does apply to public entities as employers). But see Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of
Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that "'itle H does not apply to employ-
ment."). See also Dominguez v. City of Council Bluffs, 974 F. Supp. 732, 736 (S.D. Iowa 1997)
(citing Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995)) (stating that
Doe "ruled that Title II is applicable to employment actions."). Dominguez claims that Doe al-
lowed an employment claim under Title II; however, Dr. Doe fell under Title IH not as an em-
ployee, but as a public program participant. Title I forbids discrimination in the "services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity." Dr. Doe was a neurosurgical resident in his third year of a
"six-year training program," qualifying him for Title I1 protection from discrimination by a public
entity.
19. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 822. The court's reasoning depended in part on the broad interpreta-
tion of the phrase "services, programs, or activities" in "Section 504," the statute after which
Congress modeled Title II. Id. at 821. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (1994); DOJ Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State
and Local Government Services, 28 C.F.R. § 35.172(b) (1999) ("At any time, the complainant
may file a private suit pursuant to [Title I1] of the [ADA], whether or not the designated agency
finds a violation.")(emphasis added).
21. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1184.
22. State and local governments are the nation's second-largest source of employment after the
federal government. Jean Fitzpatrick Galanos & Stephen H. Price, Comment, Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Concepts & Considerations for State & Local Government
20021
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The crux of the dispute between the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits lies with
the different degrees of deference the Courts afford the DOJ's Title II regulation
on employment under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. (Chevron). ' The regulation, titled "employment discrimination prohib-
ited," specifically states that if an employment discrimination claim falls under
both Title I and II (public employer with fifteen or more employees), 25 then the
administrative requirements of Title I apply as promulgated by the EEOC in 29
C.F.R. part 1630. However, if only Title II applies to an employer (public em-
ployer with fewer than fifteen employees), then Title I's regulations apply as
promulgated by the DOJ in 28 C.F.R part 41.26 Under the DOJ regulation, Title
11 of the ADA clearly covers employment discrimination by a public entity of
any size. 7
Employers, 21 STETSON L REv. 931, 935 (1992).
23. Title I prohibits any "covered entity" from discriminating against qualified individuals with
disabilities in that no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity "in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Title I defines a covered entity as an "employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994).
Title I defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the cur-
rent or preceding calendar year .... 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994). Note also that Title I's
definition of "employer" specifically exempts "the United States, a corporation wholly owned by
the government of the United States, or an Indian tribe" and "a bona fide private membership club
(other than a labor organization) that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26." 42
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) (1994).
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, the Supreme Court devised a two-step analysis to
evaluate an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers. First, using "tra-
ditional tools of statutory construction," the court must determine whether the statute unambigu-
ously expresses Congress' intent. Second, if the court determines that the statute is silent or am-
biguous and Congress left a gap for the administrative agency, the court must defer to the
agency's regulation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." A
court may not "substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpreta-
tion made by an administrator of an agency." If the court finds that Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue, the court must uphold Congress' unambiguously expressed intent
and "reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at
842-44 & n.9.
25. Under Title I, the definition of an employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ..." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1994). This
comment focuses primarily upon variations in the number of employees causing inconsistencies in
the coverage of Title I; however, the same argument applies to public employers that fall out of
the definition of employer under Title I because they do not employ fifteen or more people for a
long enough period of time in the year.
26. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)(l)-(2) (2001).
27. Petersen v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (cit-
ing 56 Fed. Reg. 35707-08 (July 26, 1991)) ("explaining that cross-reference to standards of Title
I in 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 was to cover employment practices of all public entities .. ").
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In Bledsoe, the Eleventh Circuit held that 1) Congress granted the DOJ the
authority to write regulations "implementing Title II's prohibition against dis-
crimination" and 2) the DOJ's regulations prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion under Title II are a "reasonable construction of [the] statutory language."28
The court considered a House Judiciary Committee Report stating that because
Title H did not specifically "list all the forms of discrimination that the title is
intended to prohibit," Congress directly granted the DOJ authority to "issue
regulations setting forth the forms of discrimination prohibited." Thus, the
court summarily concluded that the DOJ's regulations were not unreasonable.3
The Ninth Circuit in Zimmerman held that Congress unambiguously in-
tended only to allow employment discrimination claims under Title I. The
court ended its Chevron analysis at the first step of the test, granting the DOJ's
regulation no weight.32 The court reasoned that other courts had held to the con-
trary because they 1) assumed without analysis that Title II applies to employ-
ment, 2) relied only on the [DOJ]'s regulation and the legislative history of the
ADA, without discussion of the statutory text and context, 3) relied on the Re-
habilitation Act without analyzing whether Congress intended to incorporate its
prohibition against employment discrimination into Title II, or 4) relied solely
on the foregoing precedent without independent consideration of the problem-3
With Zimmerman, the Ninth Circuit closed the loophole that allowed any
public employee who also fell under Title I (fifteen or more employees) a pri-
vate right of action for employment discrimination claims. So, any public em-
ployee who also falls under Title I cannot bypass filing a claim within 180 days
and all other EEOC, Title I administrative exhaustion requirements.3' Unfortu-
nately, the Ninth Circuit's decision also narrowed the ADA's coverage by cut-
ting off critical protection to any employee of a public entity that does not have
fifteen or more employees and therefore does not fall under the definition of
employer under Title I.
28. Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 822-23
( llth Cir. 1998).
29. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. 101-485 (I), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
475).
30. Id.
31. Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 1173 ("Congress unambiguously expressed its intent for Title I1 not to apply to em-
ployment. That being so, we end our inquiry at the first step of the Chevron analysis and accord
the Attorney General's regulation no weight.").
33. Id. at 1183.
34. See supra note 17 (describing Title I administrative exhaustion requirements).
2002]
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
A. The Proposal
I propose an alternative solution that, like the Ninth Circuit, allows ADA
employment discrimination claims only under Title I. Thus, all employment
discrimination claims against both private and public employers would fall un-
der the "Employment" title of the ADA, Title I. Therefore, the EEOC, the same
agency that administers the majority of claims of racial, age, and gender em-
ployment discrimination,35 would administer all ADA employment discrimina-
tion claims. The DOJ lacks the EEOC's expertise at resolving employment dis-
crimination claims. Even though the DOJ administers Section 504, which covers
employment discrimination by federally funded agencies, the DOJ delegates
Section 504 enforcement to the twenty-six federal agencies with programs of
federal financial assistance. 6 This proposal capitalizes on the EEOC's expertise
at resolving discrimination claims' and creates a consistent, clear, and efficient
statutory and regulatory regime because all employment claims fall under the
35. EEOC, EEOC Issues Proposed Rule on Application of the ADA to the Federal Sector
Workforce at httpi/www.eeoc.gov/press/3-1-O0.html (last modified Mar. 1, 2000) listing the em-
ployment discrimination statutes that the EEOC administers:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
which prohibits discrimination against individuals 40 years of age or older; sections of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991; the Equal Pay Act; and the Rehabilitation Act's prohibitions against
disability discrimination in the federal government
Id. EEOC, EEOC Issues Status Report on Enforcement of Disabilities Act at
http:/www.eeoc.gov/press/7-13-00.html (last modified July 13, 2000). Describing how from:
[Jiuly 1992, when Title I became effective, through ... (March 31, 2000), the EEOC has ob-
tained over $300 million on behalf of more than 20,000 individuals through its enforcement ef-
forts, including settlements, conciliation, mediation, and litigation. In addition, the EEOC has
obtained non-monetary benefits for over 10,000 individuals, including reasonable accommoda-
tion, policy changes, training and education, job referrals, union membership, and the posting
of [Equal Opportunity Employment] notices at job sites.
Id.
36. Jason Powers, Employment Discrimination Claims Under ADA Title II: The Case for Uni-
form Administrative Exhaustion Requirements, 76 TEx. L REv. 1457, 1482 (1998); infra note 85.
37. See f36 CONG. REc. 11,440 (1990) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("Employers and
employees have had more than 25 years of experience with the procedures and remedies of Title
VII .... In enacting Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes, Congress has consis-
tently pursued a policy of encouraging mediation and conciliation in resolving disputes and in
avoiding unnecessary litigation."). See id. at 11,440 (statement of Rep. Smith) ("Under Title VII
with its current remedies, only 6 percent of the charged [sic] filed with the EEOC end up as law-
suits. The rest are disposed of through title Vifs mediation and conciliation procedures.").
[Vol. 28
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same title and administrative regulations.
Unlike the Ninth Circuit's solution, however, my solution will change the
statutory definition of "employer" under Title I to include all employees of pub-
lic entities with fewer than fifteen employees that are interdependent enough
with a larger government entity that they qualify under the "integrated enter-
prise" test as a single employer. 38 Thus, smaller public employers will continue
to be accountable to the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA while
smaller private and public employers that need greater protection from excess
liability and risk will continue to be shielded.
My proposal also standardizes the protection and administrative remedies
available to public and private employees and employers by not allowing public
employees to circumvent the EEOC's administrative exhaustion requirements.
In addition, the proposal capitalizes on the EEOC's administrative expertise at
preventing and resolving employment discrimination claims,39 satisfying Con-
gress' intent to promote alternative dispute resolution of employment claims and
to protect individuals with disabilities from discrimination.'
My proposal also cures the largest problem with the Ninth Circuit's inter-
pretation, the loss of protection for employees of smaller public entities that do
not fall within the definition of employer under Title I." Unlike the Ninth Cir-
cuit's solution, my approach retains comprehensive coverage and protections for
small government employers and their employees. My alternative honors Con-
gress' intent in enacting the ADA to protect individuals with disabilities from
employment discrimination by protecting all state and local government em-
ployees, regardless of the number of other employees.42
B. Implementation by the Supreme Court, the DOJ and EEOC, or Congress
1. The Supreme Court
In order to satisfy Congress' intent and implement my proposal, the Su-
38. In determining whether two corporations should be considered a single employer for pur-
poses of employment discrimination action, the "integrated enterprise" test considers four factors:
interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and com-
mon ownership or financial control. Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 460
(1998); Cellini v. Hartcourt Brace & Co., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (S.D. Cal. 1999); infra part
B(1).
39. Id.
40. Powers, supra note 36, at 1460.
41. 42 U.S.C. 1211 1(5)(A), supra note 4 (defining employer).
42. Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 821 (11th
Cir. 1998) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N at
472-73 ("The purpose of [T]itle 11 is to continue to break down barriers to the integrated participa-
tion of people with disabilities in all aspects of community life. The Committee intends that [T]itle
11 work in the same manner as Section 504.")).
20021
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preme Court must integrate the Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit decisions. To
achieve that, the Supreme Court can follow the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in
Zimmerman and rule that Congress unambiguously intended for all employment
claims to fall under Title I and the EEOC's administration. The Court can ensure
that the ADA retains the broad coverage of the Eleventh Circuit's Bledsoe deci-
sion by clarifying how to count the number of employees when a covered entity
has a relationship with a larger entity. The regulations promulgated by the
agency only restate the statutory requirements about the number of employees
required, they do not clarify how to count.43
In this situation, my proposal calls for the inclusion of all public entities
under Title I protection. The majority of public entities, state and local govern-
ments, have financial and managerial relationships with larger entities. Courts
have applied this reasoning in the public context with the "integrated enterprise
test." The test weighs four factors in determining whether the court may treat
entities as a single employer for purposes of counting the number of employees
under the ADA. The factors are 1) interrelation of operations, 2) common man-
agement, 3) centralized control of labor relations, and 4) common ownership or
financial control existing among several entities. The court considers the totality
of the circumstances and treats these factors as guideposts rather than as items
on a checklist.' The Supreme Court could adopt a similar test for courts to de-
termine whether to consider state and local governmental departments as inte-
grated with a larger governmental enterprise when determining whether the em-
ployer qualifies under Title I.
2. Federal Agencies
The EEOC and DOJ probably will not implement this solution of their own
volition because it requires the DOJ to rescind its power over ADA employment
discrimination cases and its employment discrimination regulation.4 In turn, the
EEOC would have to promulgate regulations that mandate a method of counting
employees of public entities that would include all or most of the various state
and local government employers currently excluded because they are classified
as having less than fifteen employees. Currently, the regulations promulgated by
the EEOC for Title I simply repeat the statutory requirements in the definition of
employer. The regulations do not clarify how to count the number of employees,
especially when the employer is part of a larger entity.' The new EEOC regula-
43. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e) (2001).
44. See Laird, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 460; see also Cellini, 51 F.Supp. 2d at 1034.
45. See supra note 26.
46. Interpretive Guidance 29 § 1630.2(a)-(f) (stating that the definitions of words like "em-
ployer" are identical to the terms found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. No guidance
on how to count in the EEOC Guidance documents, merely restates the rule from the statute like
[Vol. 28
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tions would have to clarify how to count the number of employees. The EEOC
could mandate that the EEOC use factors from the "integrated enterprise test" to
classify public employers as excluded from the Title I definition of employer.
This resolution probably will not occur because the DOJ will not likely under-
mine the power and jurisdiction that it has claimed for itself.
3. Congress
Congress classified employers differently based on size because it consid-
ered the impact that the size of an employer would have on its ability to comply
with the statutory requirements." Congress could amend the definition of em-
ployer under the ADA to include all state and local employers or could add em-
ployers that meet certain criteria derived from the "integrated enterprise test." In
2000, Congress demonstrated its continued commitment to ensure that the ADA
provides comprehensive coverage to individuals with disabilities when it ex-
tended the coverage of the Title I ADA employment discrimination standard to
the federal government." Thus, Congress should also take the initiative to re-
solve the inconsistency created by the current split among the circuits.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION SATISFIES CONGRESSIONAL INTENT UNLIKE
EITHER THE ELEVENTH OR NINTH CIRcurrs' SOLUTIONS
This section compares the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits' solutions with my
alternative solution according to four indices Congress valued and attempted to
include in the ADA statutory scheme: 1) clarity, consistency, and efficiency, 2)
level of comprehensive protection against employment discrimination for quali-
fied individuals, 3) promotion of administrative solutions and alternative dispute
in the EEOC regulations); EEOC: Technical Assistance on Title 7 of ADA, 8 Labor Relations
Rep. (BNA) No. 690 at 405:6983 (Jan. 27, 1992).
47. Supra note 4 (defining employer):
In part, this analysis requires a determination of whose financial resources should be considered
in deciding whether the accommodation is unduly costly. In some cases the financial resources
of the employer or other covered entity in its entirety should be considered in determining
whether the cost of an accommodation poses an undue hardship. In other cases, consideration of
the financial resources of the employer or other covered entity as a whole may be inappropriate
because it may not give an accurate picture of the financial resources available to the particular
facility that will actually be required to provide the accommodation.
Interpretive Guidance 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) app. at 356. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68-
69 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 350-51; id., pt. 3, at 40-41, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 462-64; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 56-57 (1990), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 565.
48. Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 65 Fed. Reg. 11019, n.4 (proposed Mar. 1,
2000)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614) ("Under the 1992 Amendments, the federal sector is
subject to all ADA employment discrimination standards through Section 501.").
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resolution, and 4) protection of the interests of small employers. My proposition
is the only approach that satisfies Congress' intent in each of the four categories.
A. Creating a Clear and Consistent Statutory and Regulatory Regime
1. The Eleventh Circuit
While promulgating regulations, the DOJ attempted to coordinate coverage
of Title II employment claims with Title I claims.49 Under Bledsoe, the Eleventh
Circuit deferred to the regulation under a Chevron analysis' and created a web
of regulations with four different categories of employers with drastically differ-
ent statutory and substantive and administrative regulations that apply.
FIGURE 1: Summary of the statutory and regulatory regime that covers four
categories of employers under Title I and Title II of the ADA.
Employer and Title I "Em- Title I "Public Agency's Agency's
Number of ployment" Services" Cover- Substantive Administrative
Employees Coverage? age? Regulations Regulations
Public > 15 Yes Yes EEOC DOJ or EEOC
Public <15 No Yes DOJ DOJ
Private >15 Yes No EEOC EEOC
Private <15 No No Not covered Not covered
If an individual with a disability works for a public or private employer
with fifteen or more employees, she can file a claim under Title I, like the ma-
jority of people in the workforce. The EEOC's substantive regulations apply to
all claims that qualify under Title I and they describe the purpose of the regula-
tions, definitions, unlawful activities, defenses, and specific activities permit-
ted.5' To have a valid claim as a Title I claimant, she would have to satisfy the
49. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 56
Fed. Reg. 35694 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 35.140) (explaining that although the
ADA does not specifically require inclusion of employment complaints under "[Title I in the
coordinating mechanisms required by mitle I, Federal investigations of mitle 11 employment
complaints will be coordinated on a government-wide basis also."); Department of Justice's Assis-
tance on Title H (1994) 405:51 (explaining if a public entity is subject to Title I and I then the
standards for Title I apply). Note that the statement "the standards of Title I apply" does not stipu-
late whether the section refers to the substantive or administrative standards of Title . Petersen v.
Univ. of Wis. Bd. Of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (holding that in 28
C.F.R. § 35.140 the DOJ only explicitly imposed the substantive requirements of the EEOC's
regulations on public employees that fall under both Title I and I1).
50. Supra Part I(B).
51. EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
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administrative requirements of the EEOC, including filing a claim with the
EEOC within 180 days of the alleged incident.1
2
Cases like Bledsoe have allowed individuals to make employment claims
under Title 1.51 Courts have permitted individuals to state a claim under Title II,
even when they also qualify under Title I' The DOJ attempted to standardize
the process with its employment discrimination regulations; however, the courts
have interpreted the DOJ regulation as standardizing only the substantive regu-
lations, not the administrative.55 Thus, if an individual happens to work for a
public employer, instead of a private employer with fifteen or more employees,
she still falls under the EEOC's substantive regulations but can opt out of the
EEOC's administrative exhaustion requirements. This loophole allows all of the
public employees who work for employers with more than fifteen employees
(the majority of public employees) the right to avoid filing a claim with the
EEOC and exhausting the various administrative remedies.
The loophole creates uncertainty for government employers who, without
the EEOC filing requirement, may remain unaware of a problem until long after
the incident. In Wisconsin, a federal court allowed a Title II claim up to six
years after the incident, well after the EEOC's 180-day limit. The court reasoned
that the 180-day limit in the regulation only applied to agency filings, not filings
in federal court. Thus, a plaintiff filing under Title II can circumvent the admin-
istrative filing deadline and proceed directly to federal court any time within the
state's applicable statute of limitations.'
The greater the delay between the incident and notice to the employer the
more uncertainty and risk is created for public employers. If employers quickly
learn about claims, they have an opportunity to solve the problem before injur-
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1999).
52. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12111(5), supra note 17.
53. See Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 824
(11th Cir. 1998).
54. Supra note 18.
55. Petersen v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (W.D. Wis. 1993) ("rea-
soning that it is unlikely that if the [DOJ] had meant the procedural requirements of Title I of the
[ADA] to apply to claims of employment discrimination brought under Title I, it would have
referred explicitly to only the part of the [EEOC] regulations government substantive require-
ments imposed on defendants and neglected to refer to the part of the regulations that address
procedural requirements imposed on plaintiffs.").
56. See Doe v. Milwaukee, 871 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-77 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that the
EEOC regulation 28 C.F.R. § 35.170 does not apply to filings in federal court; so, Wisconsin's
six-year statute of limitations governing personal injury suits applied). See also TAM Title I1,
supra note 17, at § 10-3 ("A charge of discrimination on the basis of disability must be filed with
EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. If there is a state or local fair employ-
ment practices agency that enforces a law prohibiting the same alleged discriminatory practice, it
is possible that charges may be filed with the EEOC up to 300 days after the alleged discrimina-
tory act.").
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ing any other individuals. If employers do not learn about claims against them, it
increases their exposure to risk of loss from claims and reduces the protections
available for individuals with disabilities. Thus, with no valid justification for
creating the inconsistency between public and private employers of the same
size, the policy promotes inequality and lacks the consistency and clarity called
for by Congress.
So far, the hypothetical individual with a disability experienced two differ-
ent results, depending on whether she worked for a public or private employer
with fifteen or more employees. To further complicate matters, if she worked for
a private employer with fewer than fifteen employees, she has no employment
discrimination claim under any title of the ADA. The final type of employer is
the public employer with fewer than fifteen employees. If an individual works
for a small public employer, under Bledsoe, she has a Title II claim. She does
not have to meet any administrative exhaustion requirements and unlike in any
of the other three situations, she now falls under substantive regulations that
differ significantly from the EEOC'sY'
The DOJ claims the inconsistencies between the DOJ and EEOC's substan-
tive regulations are not significant; however, the inconsistencies in the two ti-
tles' and agency's substantive regulations have led to interpretations by courts
and agencies that make the coverage of employment discrimination under Title
II broader than under Title I. The differences include: 1) more narrow and em-
ployment-specific definitions of "qualified individual with a disability" and
"major life activities" under Title I and the EEOC regulations,"8 2) compensa-
tory and punitive damages with a cap under Title I that are not even available
under Title IM' and 3) more specific and employment related regulatory lan-
57. Nondiscrimination, supra note 49 ("for the most part identical because mitle I of the ADA
was based on the requirements set forth in regulations implementing [S]ection 504.").
58. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (defining major life activities under Title H as "functions such
as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working"), and id. (defining a qualified individual with a disability under Title 1 as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision
of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of ser-
vices or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity"), with 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(2)-(j)(3) (refining the definition used under Title H for "major life activities" by detail-
ing factors to consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working), and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (defining a qualified individual with a
disability under Title I more specifically and appropriately for employment discrimination as "an
individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-
related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position").
59. Compare EEOC, TAM supra note 17, at § 10-2 ("Remedies for violations of Title I of the
ADA include hiring, reinstatement, promotion, back pay, front pay, restored benefits, reasonable
accommodation, attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and court costs. Compensatory and punitive
damages also may be available in cases of intentional discrimination or where an employer fails to
[Vol. 28
Americans with Disabilities Act
guage and guidance documents under Title I' The Eleventh Circuit's Bledsoe
decision therefore creates an unclear, inconsistent regulatory regime that
changes the anti-discrimination protections granted to an individual employee in
four distinci ways, based only on the type of employer for which she happens to
work.
2. The Ninth Circuit
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit that allows ADA employment claims under
two-titles and two agencies (resulting in four different classes of employers, four
different statutory and regulatory regimes, and sixteen possible enforcement
scenarios), the Ninth Circuit's Zimmerman decision limits employment claims
to Title I of the ADA as administered by the EEOC (one title and one agency).
The Ninth Circuit's solution aligns more closely with Congress' intent because
the holding promotes clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable standards that
capitalize on the EEOC's expertise at resolving employment claims through
alternative dispute resolution, not litigation. This protection, however, covers
only individuals with disabilities working for public and private entities with
fifteen or more employees, contravening Congress' intent to create sweeping
protection against discrimination for individuals with disabilities.6
make a good faith effort to provide a reasonable accommodation.") and id. § 10-8 ("Damages
may be available to compensate for actual monetary losses, for future monetary losses, for mental
anguish and inconvenience .... The total amount of punitive damages and compensatory dam-
ages for future monetary loss and emotional injury for each individual is limited, based upon the
size of the employer, using the following schedule:
Number of employees Damages will not exceed
15-100 $ 50,000
101-200 $100,000
201-500 $200,000
500 and more $300,000
with id. ("The remedies against a public employer under Title I and II cannot include punitive
damages.").
60. See EEOC: Technical Assistance on Title 1 of ADA, 8 LABOR RELATIONS REP. at
405:7022-26; id. at 405:7601 (describing accommodations required in food handling jobs); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE ADA 74-79 (1998) (listing
different types of guidance documents available through the EEOC to help employers comply
with Title I of the ADA, including "EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities" and "Americans with Disabilities Act Enforcement
Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities."); EEOC: Interpre-
tive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. (2001).
61. See supra note 5 (defining employer under Title I of the ADA) and note 1 (describing Con-
gress' intent in enacting the ADA).
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3. An Alternative Proposal
Similar to the Ninth Circuit's approach, my solution also creates clear,
strong, consistent, and enforceable standards as called for by Congress. Under
my solution, all employment discrimination claims fall under Title I, the em-
ployment title of the ADA. Therefore, the EEOC's coverage will expand
slightly because Title I will then cover claims by public employees working for
employers with fewer than fifteen people. Including public employers with less
than fifteen people will not significantly expand the EEOC's jurisdiction be-
cause it currently administers all the employment discrimination claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Equal Pay Act.'
My proposal also centralizes employment discrimination claims with the
EEOC, allowing the EEOC to administer, investigate, mediate, and/or litigate
multiple discrimination claims together. The community of individuals with
disabilities includes every race, age, sex, and national origin. ' If an individual
with a disability experiences employment discrimination due to factors other
than their disability, under my solution, they can file a claim with the EEOC and
consolidate the process." If all employment discrimination claims are filed with
the EEOC, instead of other agencies, the investigations will be centralized,
hence stream-lining the system.
B. Maintaining Broad Coverage
1. The Eleventh Circuit
Bledsoe originally filed his claim under Title I, but the Palm Beach County
Soil and Water Conservation District ("District") where he worked had no more
than five employees at the times relevant to his claim.6 The District made a
motion to dismiss because they did not qualify as an "employer" with fewer
than fifteen employees.' The trial court allowed Bledsoe to amend the com-
62. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC Issues Proposed Rule on Ap-
plication of the ADA to the Federal Sector Workforce, Mar. 1, 2000, available at http./www.eeoc.
gov/pressl3-1-00.html.
63. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 11.
64. See Sank v. City Univ. of New York, 1995 WL 314696 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1995). See also
EEOC, TAM supra note 17, at § 10-4 ("EEOC also enforces other laws that bar employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, and age (persons 40 years of age and
older). An individual with a disability can file a charge of discrimination on more than one ba-
sis.").
65. Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 818 & n.l
(I lth Cir. 1998).
66. Id. at 818 & n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)).
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plaint to bring a claim under Title II, but granted summary judgment because it
ruled that employment discrimination does not fall under Title H1.67
On appeal, the DOJ, the National Employment Lawyers Association, and
the American Civil Liberties Union all filed amicus briefs with the Eleventh
Circuit advocating the inclusion of employment claims under Title II.' The
court reasoned that the ADA was implemented "to provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities." Specifically, the court found that in enacting the ADA,
"Congress hoped to increase employment opportunities for disabled people
through prevention of employment discrimination."'7 The Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the trial court, holding that employment claims can fail under Title 11,
maintaining a broad protection under the ADA for employees of public entities,
regardless of their size."
The ADA represents an attempt by Congress to create a sweeping prohibi-
tion of discrimination against the then 43 million individuals in this country with
physical or mental disabilities in employment, services, and accommodations by
public and private entities.72 The Eleventh Circuit guarded Congress' intent by
allowing Bledsoe's claim under the ADA; however, it did so at the cost of a
clear, consistent, and efficient regulatory and statutory regime. The resulting
web of regulations, only some of which require administrative exhaustion, are
arbitrarily based on an employer's classification and undermine the Eleventh
Circuit's attempt to comply with Congress' intent.
2. The Ninth Circuit
Under Zimmerman, the Ninth Circuit denies protection under the ADA to
individuals who work for governmental entities with fewer than fifteen employ-
67. Id. at 818-19.
68. Id. at 820 & n.3. The DOJ and National Lawyers Association both stand to profit from al-
lowing claims under Title I instead of Title I. The DOJ has an interest in protecting its jurisdic-
tion over employment claims and defending its regulation 28 C.F.R. § 140.40 that includes em-
ployment discrimination under Title I. The National Lawyers Association profits when more
employment claims are allowed under the ADA and especially when they are administered by the
DOJ because plaintiffs do not have to satisfy administrative exhaustion requirements but have an
automatic private right of action.
69. Id. at 820 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
70. Id. at 820 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(3), (8), and (9)).
71. Id. at 824 & n.7.
72. "[T]itle II extends to whatever spheres of authority a state or local government is involved
in-including employment, health and service programs, the streets...." Comments from Rep.
Hoyer as he discussed the question of remedies against state and local governments. 136 CoNG.
Rnc E1916 (daily ed. June 13, 1990). 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l)-(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12209 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
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ees." Under Zimmerman, Bledsoe's claim would have failed. Congress enacted
the ADA to protect individuals with disabilities from discrimination and im-
prove their status in society.74 From the inception of the ADA, Congress and
regulatory agencies have determined that the employment discrimination protec-
tion of the ADA should extend to all employees of public entities, regardless of
size.75 The Ninth Circuit disregarded this with the Zimmerman decision, cutting
back on the protection of the flagship anti-discrimination statute for individuals
with disabilities.
3. An Alternative Solution
The Ninth Circuit approach eliminates a group of employees from cover-
age under the statute based on the size of their state or local government em-
ployer. The Eleventh Circuit provides more protection because its interpretation
covers all employees except those who work for 1) private employers who em-
ploy fewer than fifteen or 2) entities exempted under Title I's definition. 6 My
solution protects the same number of people that are protected by the Eleventh
Circuit, while providing a clear, consistent and efficient statutory and regulatory
regime to protect individuals with disabilities from employment discrimination,
making its coverage more comprehensive.
The solution places the EEOC in charge of all employment discrimination
claims under the ADA. The EEOC can use its expertise to investigate claims,
litigate or arbitrate claims, and produce guidance documents to help employers
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1997 & LEXIS 2001); supra note 5 (defining employer under
Title 1).
74. When enacting the ADA, Congress found that:
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people
with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities
for which our free society is justifiable famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependence and non-productivity.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIvii RIGHTs, supra note 60, at 10-11; Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans
with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L
REV. 123, 127 n.16 (1998) (citing Survey Shows Disabled Adults Still Earn Less, PORTLAND
OREoONIAN, July 21, 1994, at Cl) (reporting Louis Harris Survey for the National Organization
on Disability) (reporting that fifty-nine percent of the adults with disabilities live in households
with earnings of $25,000 or less, while only forty percent of adults without disabilities live in
households in the same income range).
75. TAM: Title I at 1-1. ("State and local governments, regardless of size, are covered by em-
ployment non-discrimination requirements under Title II of the ADA ... ").
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (defining employer) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) (stating that
"[t]he term 'employer' does not include--i) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the
government of the United States, or an Indian tribe; or (ii) a bona fide private membership club
(other than a labor organization) that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.").
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accommodate employees and avoid litigation. The solution capitalizes on one
agency's expertise, instead of spreading the responsibility over two agencies,
thereby decreasing the chance that statutory and regulatory requirements of the
ADA will confuse employers. In fact, the EEOC designed the regulations and
guidance documents specifically for the employment context, making them
more applicable and helpful to employers. In addition, the EEOC's administra-
tive exhaustion requirements provide some provisions for individuals who
would be irreparably harmed if forced to exhaust their administrative remedies.'
Thus, the EEOC's regulations more thoroughly contemplate and protect both
employers and employees of all types.
C. Promoting Administrative Solutions to Employment Claims'
1. The Eleventh Circuit
Congress made its intent clear when it mandated the EEOC to administer
Title I employment claims using the procedures the EEOC had successfully
implemented for Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Congress wanted to
implement clear, efficient, and proven administrative exhaustion requirements
that promote arbitration and alternative dispute resolution. The EEOC is statuto-
rily mandated to conciliate prior to litigation in cases where the agency finds
reasonable cause; the agency regularly encourages settlement between parties.m "
Requiring administrative exhaustion for employment claims "increases accu-
racy, consistency, and public acceptability of administrative decisions; con-
77. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331-32 (1976) (holding that if petitioner with disabil-
ity required to exhaust administrative requirements would experience irreparable harm that could
damage him in a way no recompensable through retroactive payments). Court decisions in various
contexts have emphasized "the nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of defer-
ment of judicial review are important factors in determining whether a statutory requirement of
finality has been satisfied." Id. at 331 n. 11 ("Mhe core principle that statutorily created finality
requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered remains applicable.").
78. This article does not address arguments against administrative exhaustion because in the
context of employment discrimination under the ADA, Congress intended to require administra-
tive exhaustion similar to that required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addi-
tion, if administrative exhaustion requirements truly are not the best administrative tool for em-
ployment claims under the ADA, they are required under Title I, but under Bledsoe not under Title
ff. No sound reason exists for the discrepancy. In fact, requiring public employers to participate in
administrative exhaustion might prove more effective than with private employers because public
employers do not generally operate for profit and should function as models of non-discrimination
in the community.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), supra note 2; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
80. Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L REv. 431,
445 nn.96-97; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1995) (directing the EEOC to
encourage settlement and establish settlement procedures).
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serves judicial resources; discourages forum shopping;" and capitalizes on
agency expertise.8 '
The Eleventh Circuit's solution fails to promote administrative resolution
of employment claims, contravening Congress' intent. Under Bledsoe, public
employees may circumvent Title I and the EEOC's administrative exhaustion
requirements by filing a claim under Title II. Individuals may file a complaint
with the DOJ within 180 days from the date of the discrimination;' 2 however, it
is not required. Employees have an automatic private right of action under Title
11.3 The Eleventh Circuit's decision undermines Congress' intent to promote a
clear, efficient, and proven administrative remedy to employment discrimination
claims. The decision fails to conserve judicial resources or capitalize on the
EEOC's expertise at quickly and effectively investigating and resolving claims.
The DOJ can argue that although it does not require administrative exhaus-
tion, some individuals do file claims and the DOJ investigates and attempts to
resolve those claims without litigation. The EEOC, however, has much more
expertise in dealing with employment discrimination cases than the DOJ. The
DOJ administers Section 504 claims, a large percentage of which are employ-
ment claims.' The DOJ investigates far fewer employment discrimination
claims than the EEOC, because the DOJ does not administer all of the Section
504 claims; they delegate the claims to 26 other federal agencies.' In addition,
the investigations under Section 504 focus upon whether to cut off federal fund-
ing to the programs, not arbitration and mediation as an advocate of the em-
81. Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental
Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L REv. 1, 4 (1985).
82. 28 C.F.R. § 35.170 (a),(b) (1999).
83. 28 C.F.R. § 35.172(b) (1999) ("At any time, the complainant may file a private suit pursuant
to section 203 of the [ADA], whether or not the designated agency finds a violation." (emphasis
added)).
84. Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relation-
ship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title 11 of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1089, 1106 n.99 (1995).
85. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services; Final
Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694, 35,708 (July 26, 1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35):
The [DOJI, together with the other Federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of Federal
laws prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of disability, recognizes the potential
for jurisdictional overlap that exists with respect to coverage of public entities and the need to
avoid problems related to overlapping coverage. The other Federal agencies include the
[EEOC] which is the agency primarily responsible for enforcement of [T]itle I of the ADA, the
Department of Labor, which is the agency responsible of enforcement of section 503 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, and 26 Federal agencies with programs of Federal financial assistance,
which are responsible for enforcing section 504 in those programs.
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ployee's individual claim and compensation.16 Therefore, centralizing all em-
ployment claims under the ADA with the EEOC would result in a more clear
and efficient statutory and regulatory regime.
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit's solution promotes the clear, efficient, and proven tool
of administrative exhaustion to resolve employment claims because all claims
fall under Title I, as administered by the EEOC. The only problem with the
Ninth Circuit's resolution is the exclusion of all individuals who happen to work
with a public employer with fewer than fifteen people. The Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing completely excludes them from accessing any remedy under the ADA.
3. An Alternative Solution
My solution extends the administrative remedies of the EEOC to all public
employees covered under the Eleventh Circuit's holding, as intended by Con-
gress. This alternative solution ensures both employees and employers the pro-
tections of consistent, clear, efficient, comprehensive, and proven administrative
remedies tailored to employment discrimination claims.
D. Protecting the Interests of Small Government Employers
1. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation fails to protect small government em-
ployers because it 1) exposes employers to more costs from investigations and
litigation because employees have an automatic private right of action;' 2) in-
creases the risk of exposure to employers who are unaware of claims that are
pending against them, and 3) provides little administrative guidance, especially
in the employment context."
86. -Peterson v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F.Supp. 1276, 1279 (W.D. Wis. 1993)
("Both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provide only for termi-
nation of federal funding for violations of their provisions and do not explicitly address private
suits. Because private plaintiffs may sue under these statutes only by virtue of private rights of
action implied by the courts and because they receive no effective relief through administrative
channels, these plaintiffs need not resort to administrative remedies before bringing an action in
court.") (citation omitted).
87. Compare TAM: Title I at § 10-3-10-7, supra note 17 (outlining the EEOC administrative
requirement of filing a complaint within 180 days), with 28 C.F.R. § 35.172 (1999) (providing a
private right of action "at any time").
88. Compare EEOC, TAM: Title 1, supra note 17 (providing many examples of employment
situations), with DOJ, Technical Assistance Manual for Title 11 (1992) (providing few examples of
employment situations).
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Small employers in particular are not likely to have in-house counsel to
litigate private employment claims as they occur. If an employee wants to file a
claim with the DOJ for investigation and possible mediation or litigation, the
employee must file within 180 days. " If a complaint is filed, the agency encour-
ages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution.9 Under Bledsoe, em-
ployees are not required to file claims with the DOJ; therefore, not all claims
will be investigated or evaluated for their validity by the agency.9' The lack of a
requirement of administrative exhaustion provides little opportunity for alterna-
tive dispute resolution or administrative investigation without litigation, increas-
ing the cost to private employers and employees.
Requiring administrative exhaustion protects employers by infoniing them
about any claim that may be pending against them within 190 (days of its occur-
rence.' Without an administrative exhaustion requirement, time passes; memo-
ries fade; people change jobs; and evidence is lost. One federal district court
allowed a claim six years after the discriminatory incident.' The delay can lead
to an increased cost of the investigation and a reduced chance that viable claims
will be resolved due to loss of evidence. In addition, if employers are not made
aware of problems quickly, the employer is not given an opportunity to cure the
problem before multiple individuals are injured and the employer is exposed to
the risk of multiple employment discrimination claims.
Mandating administrative exhaustion also allows the agency an opportunity
to rectify its own mistakes. Under Title I, the EEOC will investigate a claim and
then release the preliminary findings of the investigation to both parties, describ-
ing whether the EEOC believes there is cause to think that discrimination has
occurred and the type of relief that may be necessary." Both parties then have
the opportunity to submit further information and after reviewing all informa-
tion, the EEOC sends an official "Letter of Determination" to the charging party
and the respondent, stating whether it has or has not found "reasonable cause" to
89. 28 C.F.R. § 35.170 (1999) (describing that an individual may file a complaint not later than
180 days) (emphasis added); 28 C.F.R. § 35.172(a) (1999) (mandating that a "designated" agency
shall investigate each complete complaint, attempt informal resolution, and if resolution is not
achieved, issue.., a Letter of Findings ...."). If the agency finds noncompliance, the agency
shall attempt to secure voluntary compliance or refer the matter to the Attorney General with a
recommendation for appropriate action. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.172-35.174 (1999).
90. 28 C.F.R. § 35.176 (1999) (encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution, including
"settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials and arbitra-
tion").
91. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.170; Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist.,
133 F.3d 816, 819 (11 th Cir. 1998).
92. TAM: Title I, supra note 17, at § 10-5 (stating that (1) an employee must file a claim with
the EEOC within 180 days of the incident and (2) within 10 days of receipt of a charge, the EEOC
sends written notification of receipt to the respondent and the charging party).
93. Doe v. Milwaukee, 871 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
94. TAM: Title I supra note 17, at § 10-5, 10-6.
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believe that discrimination occurred.95 Administrative exhaustion enhances the
efficiency of the system, but it is not required for claims against small employ-
ers under Bledsoe.
2. The Ninth Circuit
Under Zimmerman, small public entities are completely protected because
their employees are not covered at all against employment discrimination.
3. An Alternative Proposal
Small governmental entities do not require and should not receive the same
protection against suit as small private business. The ADA's legislative history
"seems to indicate that Congress wanted to end discrimination by governmental
units, regardless of size--a burden they were not willing to foist onto small busi-
nesses."'' In fact, small governmental units are distinct from small businesses
because discrimination lawsuits do not threaten their existence and small gov-
ernments can raise taxes without losing customers.' In addition, larger govern-
mental units (states or departmental bureaucracies) arguably support most small
governmental units. " The government should also be held to a higher standard
and serve as a model against discrimination.
Congress also embedded protection for different size employers in Title I.
Thus, although my proposal extends coverage to small public employers like in
Bledsoe, it grants the added protection of Title I's statutory regime and adminis-
trative remedies under the EEOC. The EEOC's regulations and guidance protect
smaller government employers by 1) reducing the accommodations required for
and penalties available to employees depending on the size of the employer and
2) requiring administrative exhaustion."
Congress and the EEOC accommodated employers of different sizes under
the ADA by requiring different levels of compliance and different amounts of
damages. The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual for Title I mandates that
the "total amount of punitive damages and compensatory damages for future
95. Id.
96. Jason Powers, Note, Employment Discrimination Claims Under ADA Title II: The Case for
Uniform Administrative Exhaustion Requirements, 76 Tx. L REv 1457, 1489 (1998).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Covered entities need not engage in actions that would cause fundamental alteration in their
programs or an undue burden. See, e.g. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (holding federal
grantees do not have to make distributive decisions in a way most favorable to persons with dis-
abilities); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (holding that a col-
lege's reasonable physical fitness requirements for its nursing program were not barred by Section
504).
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monetary loss and emotional injury for each individual is limited, based upon
the size of the employer."'' The statute and regulations under Title I protect the
small employer because they define discrimination in part as "not making rea-
sonable accommodations . . . [for] an otherwise qualified individual with a dis-
ability . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such cov-
ered entity . . . ."10 Title I's statute and regulations define "undue hardship" as
"an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" in light of a range of fi-
nancial and operational factors that impact whether a particular reasonable ac-
commodation would impose an undue hardship on the entity's operations."° The
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance includes legislative history stating:
An employer or other covered entity is not required to provide an accommo-
dation that will impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's
or other covered entity's business. The term "undue hardship" means signifi-
cant difficulty or expense in, or resulting from, the provision of the accom-
modation. The "undue hardship" provision takes into account the financial
realities of the particular employer or other covered entity. However, the
concept of undue hardship is not limited to financial difficulty. "Undue hard-
ship" refers to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive,
substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or op-
eration of the business.'0 3
The consideration of an employer's size does not completely excuse the small
employer from complying with the ADA. If an employer can display an undue
hardship, it still must show that funding for the accommodation is not available
100. TAM: Title I, supra note 17, at § 10-8 (limiting damages to $50,000 for employees of enti-
ties with up to 100 employee, but granting up to $300,000 to employees of entities with 500 or
more employees) (emphasis added); supra note 59.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
102. 65 Fed. Reg. 11020 (Mar. 1, 2000). To assess undue hardship, courts can consider 1) The
nature and net cost of the accommodation, considering the availability of tax credits and deduc-
tions and/or outside funding; 2) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved
in making the accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the
facility; 3) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a
covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its
facilities; 4) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition,
structure, and functions of the workforce, and the geographic separateness and the administrative
and fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity; and 5) the im-
pact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the impact on the ability
of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to conduct busi-
ness. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (1994) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630(p)(2) (1999).
103. Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(1999) (citing Senate Report at 35; House
Labor Rep. at 67).
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from another source like a state vocational rehabilitation agency or tax credits.°4
The EEOC also protects smaller employers by producing guidance docu-
ments that target their specific needs" and requiring administrative exhaustion.
Administrative exhaustion not only helps smaller entities by granting them no-
tice, beginning a timely investigation, facilitating alternative dispute resolution,
and allowing for administrative appeals as described above in Part II(C)(1), but
also requires individuals to focus their discrimination claims and limits the
claims available in future suits."° The scope of disability discrimination com-
plaints is limited to the scope of EEOC investigation that can reasonably be ex-
pected to grow out of a charge of discrimination. This limitation on the potential
scope of an investigation protects all employers, but especially smaller employ-
ers with fewer resources for investigations or to cope with surprise litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress intended the ADA to function as a flagship anti-discrimination
statute. 7 However, protection from employment discrimination under the ADA
is sinking into inconsistency and unpredictability.
The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation provides employees with broad statu-
tory coverage and administrative leeway to make a claim, but creates a web of
inconsistent regulations and exposes employers to increased risk and uncer-
tainty. The risk and uncertainty in the Eleventh Circuit's solution stems from the
loophole it creates that allows all public employees to circumvent Title I's ad-
ministrative exhaustion requirements, leaving their employer unaware of claims
pending against them and unable to resolve problems quickly, without litigation.
The Ninth Circuit decision creates a clear, strong, consistent, and enforce-
104. No employer need provide an accommodation if it will result in an undue hardship--
depends on the size of employer and availability of resources, including outside grants and, if
offered, the sharing of accommodation costs by the employee. 28 CFR § 42.511 (a)(1993). See
Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p); 29 CFR §1630.2(2)(i) (1993) (stating the em-
ployee's or applicant's willingness to pay for some or all of the cost of an accommodation, or the
availability of funding from some other source outside the employer (such as the state vocational
service) also will be considered in determining whether a particular accommodation imposes
"undue hardship."). But see Olmstead v L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 n.6 (1999) (holding
that in a Title I1 case it is not adequate to only consider the resources of a public entity to evaluate
undue burden and fundamental alteration).
105. U.S. EEOC, SMALL EMPLOYERS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, (1999), available at
httpJ/www.eeoc.gov/facts/accommodation.html (last modified Mar. 1, 1999).
106. An employee cannot bring suit if claim exceeds scope of charges employee filed with
EEOC because it 1) ensures notification of the charged parties about alleged violations and 2)
allows parties the opportunity to resolve the conflict without resorting to litigation; however, in
accord with the remedial purposes of the ADA, courts construe EEOC charges with the utmost
liberality. Carlson v. Northwestern Univ., 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 797 (ND fI1. Apr. 14,
1994).
107. Supra note 1 (describing Congress' intent in enacting the ADA).
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able statutory scheme that capitalizes on the EEOC's expertise at investigating
and resolving employment discrimination claims, but revokes protection against
employment discrimination from all individuals with disabilities who happen to
work for public entities with fewer than fifteen employees.
This article beckons to the Supreme Court, the EEOC and DOJ, or Con-
gress to fulfill Congress' intent under the ADA and extend unprecedented pro-
tection to individuals with disabilities by expanding ADA protection to all pub-
lic employees."° My proposal protects both employers and employees by pro-
moting administrative solutions to employment claims and protecting smaller
employers. My solution integrates the strongest aspects of each Circuit's resolu-
tion, creating a consistent, clear, efficient, and comprehensive statutory and
regulatory regime that effectively protects individuals with disabilities from
employment discrimination, without contravening Congress' intent.
108. Id.
[Vol. 28238
